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Abstract 
The liberalization and reregulation of the Chilean economy from 1973 through 1983 
generates useful lessons on potential pitfalls in the transition from an illiberal to a liberalized 
economy. This article reviews the measures adopted by Chilean authorities during this period and 
their macro impact on the economy. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the financial 
sector in the economic crisis that emerged in the early 1980s. This experience underscores the 
need for appropriate regulation in an economy ongoing deregulation. 
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ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN LESS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
THE CHILEAN CASE 
by 
Nelson Aguilera-Alfred and Douglas H. Graham 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last several years a considerable body of evidence has accumulated about the process 
of economic liberalization in less developing countries (LDCs). During the 1970s many Latin 
American countries - most noticeably, the southern cone countries - adopted a new set of policies 
to deal with their long-standing economic problems. The specifics of the strategies differed among 
countries, however, all strategies implied one or more of the following measures: (a) an opening 
of foreign trade; (b) deregulation of the domestic financial market - i.e., elimination of domestic 
credit controls, interest-rate ceilings, and differential reserve requirements; (c) an opening to 
international financial flows; and (d), the elimination of entry barriers for foreign banks. The 
specific objective of these liberalization policies was to eliminate distortions in the allocation of 
resources and change the country's basic economic structure. However, international economic 
events have demonstrated the vulnerability of individual countries to external disturbances or 
"shocks". Thus, the positive effects of such policies turned out to be short-lived and the countries 
that had been at the forefront of liberalization suffered significant reversals in their economic 
performance. 
Increases in the price of crude oil in 197 4 and 1979-1980, stagnation of world demand for 
primary products in 1980-1982, and the concurrent worsening of the terms of trade were the major 
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disturbances during the 1970s and 1980s. Substantial increases in real interest rates were another 
shock that increased balance-of-payment pressures on debtor countries. All these shocks forced 
major adjustments in the trade flows of the domestic economies of developing countries'. Another 
"shock" to the domestic economy was inconsistent and counterproductive government policies 
attempting to restore efficient resource use following changes in the external environment. 
Shock induced structural adjustment occurs in both production and expenditure decisions 
when economic decision-making is governed by rational (optimizing) behavior. Adjustment to 
external shocks and government policies has both sector specific ("microeconomic") and econ-
omy-wide ("macroeconomic") dimensions. The microeconomic perspective underscores the effect 
of the adjustment process on the structure, conduct, and performance of a specific sector. 
Macroeconomic analysis highlights the impact of the adjustment process on economic growth, 
inflation, and the trade balance. 
Oil importing developing countries, (OIDCs) in contrast to developed countries, failed to 
adopt appropriate measures to adjust their economies to changes in the economic environment 
during the 1970s. Despite this contrasting performance the oil import dependence of both 
developed and oil importing developing economies is comparable. Yet, as shown in Table 1, the 
ratio of the current account deficit to GNP rose much more rapidly for the OIDCs than for the 
developed countries. The deficits of the larger OIDCs resulted in a significant jump in their net 
debt (defined as gross debt minus foreign exchange reserves) as a percent of gross national 
product. Again in 1979 and 1980 increasing current account deficits resulted in increasing debts 
for OIDCs. 
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The Chilean economy provides an interesting case study of the process of economic 
liberalization in OIDCs during the 1970s and 1980s. For 14 years, between 1973 and 1987, a 
deep process of economic liberalization has been implemented which transformed the Chilean 
economy. Reform of the financial system, the opening of the foreign trade sector and domestic 
stabilization policies were the three key "initiatives" in this open market model. As can be seen 
in Table 2, this process of economic liberalization was bracketed by two recessions in 1975 and 
1982, years in which the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell 12.9 percent and 14.3 percent, 
respectively. The 1982 recession was accompanied by a collapse of the financial system that 
brought about, in January 1983, massive government intervention in the commercial banking 
system. 
Several explanations have been advanced to explain the disappointing results described 
above. In general, the explanations have pointed to government mismanagement in the implemen-
tation of liberalization and stabilization measures, and to the role of external shocks as the 
principal causes of these negative results. A point on which all agree is the contribution of a 
poorly regulated financial system. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the stabilization and liberalization measures that 
Chilean economic authorities implemented after September 1973. More specifically we document 
and evaluate the financial crisis of 1982 and its aftermath. 
The paper is organized in five sections: Section I presents some of the more important 
measures contained in the economic reform package implemented by the Chilean military regime 
after September 1973; section II evaluates the principal effects of these reforms on the Chilean 
economy; Section III analyzes the impact, by region and economic activity, of the economic 
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reform and external shocks on deposit and loan activities of the Chilean financial system during 
the 1970s and early 1980s; section IV presents details related to the financial crisis growing out 
of the recession of 1982. Section V presents the concluding remarks. 
I THE KEY POLICY MEASURES OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION 
AND LIBERALIZATION 
In 1973 the Chilean economy was in severe macroeconomic disequilibrium, suffering acute 
foreign exchange shortages, and high inflation. Extensive price controls, protective tariffs, quotas, 
subsidies and export taxes maintained a severely distorted structure of relative prices. Late in 
1973, the Chilean political environment changed drastically when a military regime assumed 
political power. The new government implemented an economic reform package to control 
relative price distortions and reduce inflation. The most important reforms were in domestic 
commodity markets and the foreign trade sector. However, important reforms were also imp le-
mented in the capital and financial markets, and finally in the labor market. 
Domestic Price Liberalization 
The deregulation of domestic prices was a top priority. Price deregulation began in 
October 1973 with the enactment of decree law 522 which defined pricing criteria for a wide range 
of goods and services. The prices of a large group of goods were allowed to be freely determined 
by producers and importers. The prices of a second group of commodities, such as sugar, oil, tea, 
milk, and processed foods were allowed to be modified subject to previous cost studies. Finally, 
prices for a third group of goods and services could be modified by merely informing the 
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economic authorities of the new prices . The final step in domestic price deregulation was taken 
in December 1980, when a new decree law (No. 3529) prohibited the transfer of commodities 
in group three above to the category containing goods with fixed prices. 
Foreign Trade Polices 
In October 1973 a process of tariff liberalization and a new exchange rate regime were 
initiated. On the one hand, the average tariff was reduced from 106 percent to a uniform rate of 
10 percent tariff rate in 1977. On the other hand, the new exchange rate regime reduced a multiple 
exchange rate regime to a three-rate system. This change was accompanied by a 300 percent 
devaluation of the peso. During 1974, 24 devaluations were made with a mean devaluation rate 
of 6.9 percent, and an annual rate of 392.1 percent (Corbo, 1986). In 1975 the exchange rate 
policy introduced mini devaluations. During 1976 a 10 percent revaluation was effected and a new 
devaluation mechanism was introduced indexing the exchange rate to the rate of inflation. In 
December 1977 the government announced that the rate of devaluation would exceed the inflation 
rate to compensate for tariff reductions. In February 1978 another exchange rate regime was 
implemented. This new regime consisted of pre-announced mini devaluations, known as "la 
tablita". In June 1979 the exchange rate was fixed at a rate of 39 pesos per dollar. This rate was 
maintained until June 1982, when a devaluation of 18 percent was carried out, and the peso was 
pegged to a basket of foreign currencies. 
Capital and Financial Market Reforms 
6 
The reforms in the financial market were numerous. In December 1973 new bank establish-
ments were prohibited until December 1974 when rules were enacted with respect to the organiza-
tion and functioning of financial institutions. In January 1976 a law was enacted covering the 
management of mutual funds (fondos mutuos). 
Until September 1973, nominal interest rates were fixed by the Central Bank. Since real 
interest rates were highly negative, most credit was allocated by quotas. The liberalization of 
domestic financial markets began in May 1974 when financial corporations (financieras) were 
authorized to determine freely the interest rate for deposits with a maturity longer than 60 days. 
In May 1974 the interest rates on loans were also liberalized subject to the constraint that they did 
not exceed 50 percent of the current interest rate for inflation-adjusted operations or non-adjusted 
operations, whichever was relevant for the case in question. By June 1975 this limit was com-
pletely eliminated. In October 1975, commercial banks were finally authorized to determine 
freely their deposit and loan rates. As the regulatory advantages for financieras were reduced 
these institutions lost importance in financial markets. With respect to debt allowances, the 
maximum debt/capital ratio for commercial banks had been 20 since 1974. The capital account 
remained virtually closed until September 1977 when commercial banks were allowed finally to 
engage in foreign debt transactions under article 14 of the exchange rate regime.1 However, the 
maximum monthly inflow was limited to 5 percent of the capital and reserves of each bank. 
Before 1977, only public sector and large private enterprises intermediated most medium-term 
capital inflows. Banks were only involved in the short-term finance. 
Article 14 refers to the permission given by the Central Bank to borrowers for future 
access to foreign exchange to service a foreign debt. 
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In June 1979, commercial banks were allowed to intermediate capital inflows with an 
overall (internal and external) borrowing limit established at twenty times their capital and 
reserves. At the same time, the amount of monthly borrowing under article 14 was reduced to 5 
percent of capital and reserves or one million dollars, whichever was lower. This restriction, 
however, was completely eliminated in April 1980 . 
Labor Market Reforms 
Reforms in the labor sector began in 1974 when discriminatory benefits were gradually 
eliminated. Family allowances and retirement ages were made uniform for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. Social security contributions were slowly reduced, and labor union power 
was severely constrained. In 1979 and 1981 vacations, indemnizations,and employee profit sharing 
were made more flexible for owners. Furthermore, employers were authorized to lay-off workers 
without justification, and the minimum salary was reduced. In 1979 the labor plan reintroduced 
collective bargaining and wages were indexed to the consumer price index (CPI). However in 
June 1982, after the first devaluation in three years, wage indexation was suspended, and in 
December of that year corrective legislation was introduced for a wage floor. 
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II THE MACRO-RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Macroeconomic Effects 
By 1975 some of the government's objectives were partially achieved (see Table 2). The 
fiscal deficit was reduced from 24.7 percent in 1973 to only 2.6 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1975. The balance-of-payments crisis was averted, and relative prices were 
realigned. Although the reduction of inflation was a top priority, a gradual stabilization policy 
was adopted to avoid excessive "social cost" of a shock treatment. In 1975 Ml increased 258 
percent, slightly slower than the most expansionary year of the Allende regime (i.e., 317 percent 
in 1973). On the other hand, the world recession of 1974-75 affected Chile severely. By 1975 the 
Chilean economy was experiencing a deep fall in GDP (12.9 percent), despite the gradual 
stabilization program. 
The rigor of the fiscal measures were felt immediately. By December 197 4 output in the 
manufacturing sector fell 12.8 percent compared to December 1973, and by December 1975 
manufacturing output had fallen 21 percent with respect to December 1974 (Table 2 Column 7). 
The unemployment rate also experienced marked increases. In 1975 the unemployment rate in 
Greater Santiago had increased dramatically to 16.2 percent from 4. 7 percent in 1973 (Table 2 
Column 8). However this increase in unemployment is somewhat exaggerated. The low rate of 
unemployment recorded for 1973 reflects an artificially high employment rate generated by 
politically inspired measures in the last year of the Allende Administration to force a highlevel of 
featherbedded employment in many enterprises falling into state receivership. This level of 
employment could never have been economically sustained in the future. 
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The stabilization program had a limited effect in reducing inflation. By the end of 1975 the 
annual rate of inflation stood at 340 percent (Table 2 Column 2). By 1975 the deterioration in the 
terms of trade had reached alarming levels, 37 percent with respect to 1974 (Column 9), at the 
same time the projected deficit of the balance of payment reached 344 million dollars (Column 3). 
After these disappointing results the government decided to apply drastic anti-inflationary 
measures with a tighter monetary policy. These actions reduced the annual rate of growth of Ml 
from 258 percent at the end of December 1975 to 67 percent at the end of 1978 (Table 2 Column 
4) with consequent decline in inflation from 17 4. 3 percent in 197 6, to 63. 5 percent in 1977, and 
only 30.3 percent in 1978. The economy rapidly recovered showing a record increase of GDP of 
9. 9 percent in 1977. Industrial production increased to a record level in 197 6. Nevertheless, 
despite the positive results generated by this severe anti-inflationary policy, the government still 
considered inflation excessive. 
A new stabilization program was launched in February 1978, with the exchange rate as the 
principal instrument to reduce the inflationary impact of frequent devaluations. The objective was 
to reduce the inflationary expectations of the private sector. Nevertheless, inflation did not 
decline. On the contrary, prices increased almost 40 percent in 1979. This lead the government 
to adopt the extreme measure of a fixed exchange rate in June 1979. 
Contrary to government expectations, as shown in Table 3, inflation did not decline to the 
world (i.e. , U.S.) level. The exchange rate freeze in 1979 and the lack of convergence of Chilean 
inflation to world inflation brought a growing overvaluation of the exchange rate. As seen in Table 
2, the terms of trade began to deteriorate by 9 percent in 1980 and 24 and 18 percent in 1981 and 
1982. This period concluded with a deep recession in 1982 in which GDP fell 14.3 percent. The 
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unemployment rate reached levels never seen before in Greater Santiago, 22.1 percent. The 
balance of payments deficit reached record levels of 1, 165 and 541 million dollars in 1982 and 
1983, respectively. 
The Financial Crisis 
The 1982 recession was accompanied by a severe crisis in the financial sector. This 
triggered massive government intervention in the commercial banking system on January 13 1983, 
and brought an end to the laissez-faire approach that had characterized Chilean financial policies 
in the post-1973 era. The principal feature of this laissez-faire world permitted commercial banks 
to merge and consolidate into an oligopolistic market structure. Furthermore, they were allowed 
to combine with non-bank enterprises to form economic groups or conglomerates. This ignored 
the potential conflicts of interest that could, and in fact did, emerge as alleged banks drew upon 
depositor funds to try and bail out failing conglomerate firms during the recession. This lack of 
explicit regulatory protection of depositor interests increased the element of "moral hazard" in the 
Chilean financial system (McKinnon 1988). 
Between 1983 and 1986 the government engaged in two global reschedulings of private 
sector debt (foreign and domestic), purchased large quantities of uncollectible loans from the banks 
at face value, provided large subsidies to dollar debtors, and monitored the bankruptcy and 
restructuring of some of the largest firms in the economy. Only by mid-1986 did the financial 
system begin to return to normal with the re-privatization of a number of large banks and financial 
companies. 
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III EVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The metropolitan area of Santiago, the Aconcagua - Valparaiso (region V), and the Nuble 
- Concepcion (region VII) are traditionally the regions in which more than 70 percent of deposit 
and loan activities of the Chilean financial system have been concentrated. Therefore an analysis 
of the financial activity in these regions is important to understand the Chilean financial crisis in 
1982. In this section we shall analyze the financial statistics of these three regions with special 
emphasis on loan allocation by region and economic activity. 
Deposits by Region 
As can be seen in Table 4, until 1983 deposits in Chilean currency were highly concen-
trated in the Metropolitan region. Chilean deposits in this region increased from 56.9 percent in 
1970 to 69.7 percent in 1983. In the meantime, the share of deposits in Chilean currency fell from 
11.0 and 8.3 percent in 1970 to 9.0 and 5.6 percent in 1983 in regions V and VII, respectively. 
The regional concentration of deposits in foreign currency in 1979 and 1980 was even 
higher than the regional concentration of deposits in Chilean currency. Thus, more than 76.9 
percent of the deposits in foreign currency in 1979-1980 period were held in the Metropolitan 
area. Another 13.7 percent was held in region V. Thus, more than 90 percent of the deposits in 
foreign currency were concentrated in the Metropolitan area of Santiago and the 
Aconcagua-Valparaiso region (i.e. region V). This extremely high concentration of deposit 
activity in the Metropolitan region is a reflection of a high degree of unbalanced regional 
development. 
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Loans by Region 
As early as 1970 Table 4 shows that the Santiago Metropolitan Area received 68.3 percent 
of the total loans in Chilean currency. The lowest value of the decade was reached in 197 4 ( 61. 7 
percent). This share, however, climbed steadily from 64.9 percent in 1975 to 77.6 percent in 
1980. 
Region VII (Nuble - Concepcion) appeared to be highly affected during the period of 
economic liberalization. In fact this region's share of loans in Chilean currency suffered a 
substantial decline from 5.0 percent in 1970 to 2.4 percent in 1980. Region V (Aconcagua -
Valparaiso) experienced a slight fall from 6.7 percent in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1980. Thus, loan 
concentration, similar to deposit concentration, increased markedly during the period of financial 
and trade liberalization. This suggests the existence of imperfections in the financial sector 
preventing a more balanced distribution of credit. 
Loans by Economic Activity 
Table 5 indicates that during the Allende administration, loans in Chilean currency to the 
public sector increased five-fold in a two year period, from 5.3 percent in 1970 to 26.7 percent 
in 1972. The tradable sector suffered the sharpest decline in terms of relative importance, with 
its share falling from 61.6 percent in 1970 to 31.3 percent in 1972 (Table 5). Subsequently, 
during the period 1973-1978 bank loans to the tradable sector increased to 50.2 percent and credit 
to the public sector decreased from 52.6 percent in 1973 to only 5 percent of total credit in 1978. 
The period 1979-1983 shows a declining trend in loans to the tradable sector in Table 5, 
while the share of loans to intermediate non-tradable activities increased steadily from 24.9 percent 
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of total credit in 1978 to 50 .1 percent in 1983. There was an important increase in private sector 
credit classified as others (i.e. not-well specified activities). In fact, these loans increased 
four-fold in a three-year period from 1978 to 1981. The opening of the capital account in 1979 
appears to be related to this surprising increase in the financing of these poorly specified activities. 
The credit in dollar loans shows similar characteristics to the allocation of credit in local 
currency. However, there is a sharp decrease in dollar loans to the public sector. In 1974, dollar 
loans to the public sector registered more than 10 percent, however, by the end of 1984 there was 
practically no dollar credit to the public sector. Dollar Credit for non-tradable intermediate 
activities were highly favored. Immediately after 1979, with the opening of the capital account, 
the share of dollar credit allocated to tradable activities began to decline and the credit to 
non-tradable activities, both intermediate and final goods increased. This situation appears to be 
linked to the growing overvaluation of the exchange rate during 1979-1982. 
As seen in Table 6, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in total bank loans in 
Chilean currency, which had fallen from 24.3 percent in 1970 to 19.8 percent in 1972, has 
fluctuated sharply since 1973. This share increased to 36 percent of total loans in 197 6. However, 
it decreased to 21.5 percent by 1978. The share of credit to manufacturing industries followed 
a similar pattern increasing from 13.3 percent of total credit in 1973 to 37.5 percent in 1975.2 
However, the share in total credit of this sector declined to 27.2 percent in 1977 with a slight 
recovery in 1978 (27.9 percent). 
2 This sharp change was in part due to the reduction of credit to the area of social owner-
ship. 
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The share of the trade sector in total credit showed the most significant change during this 
period. The share of total bank credit in domestic currency allocated to trade increased from 4.6 
percent in 1973 to 22.4 percent in 1978. Another important change in the structure of bank loans 
is the share of bank loans in Chilean currency to communal, social and personal services, which 
increased from a modest 2.3 percent of total credit to 8.9 percent in 1978. Particularly evident is 
the unusual increase of consumer credit from 1. 5 percent in 1977 to 5 percent of total credit in 
1978. The share of loans going to the financial sector rose from 4.7 percent in June 1979 to 24.2 
percent in December 1982, an increase that can be explained by the decline of this sector as a 
result of trade liberalization, the introduction of a fixed exchange rate, and by the increasing 
dependency of conglomerate enterprises on foreign currency loans. The share of the trade sector 
in total credit declined from 22.8 percent in June 1979 to 14.5 percent in December 1983. During 
this same period the share of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) declined 
sharply from 18.7 percent, in June 1979 to 12.8 percent in December 1983. Finally, the 
proportion of loans in domestic currency to the construction sector increased from 4. 8 percent in 
June 1979 to 11.3 percent in December 1983. Dollar loans directed towards non-tradeable 
intermediate activities increased sharply from 16 percent of total loans in 1978 to 30. 7 percent in 
1982. Furthermore, the dollar credits to tradeable activities were drastically reduced from 64.4 
percent of total loans in 1978 to 37 .2 percent in 1982 (Table 7). 
IV ECONOMIC REFORM AND FINANCIAL COLLAPSE: 
THE ISSUES AND THE EVIDENCE 
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Several explanations have been emphasized to explain the financial collapse in Chile. 
Government mismanagement in the implementation of its liberalization and stabilization measures, 
and external shocks have been pointed out as the major causes of the disappointing results 
described earlier. 
The discussion surrounding the government's mismanagement has centered on four 
decisions taken after 1978: 
1. The fixing of the exchange rate in June 1979; 
2. The decision to legislate the complete indexation of nominal wages to past inflation 
in June 1979; 
3. The substantial relaxation of controls on the capital account of the balance of 
payments during 1979 and 1980; and, 
4. The existence of a poorly regulated financial system deficient in protecting 
depositors interests. 
Corbo (1985) has attributed the main responsibility of the 1982 deep recession and financial 
crisis to the fixed exchange rate regime established in 1979. This led to an increasing overvalu-
ation of the Chilean peso during the period 1979-1982. Harberger (1984), however, has suggested 
that the effect of overvaluation only began to impact the Chilean economy in 1981, almost two 
years after the fixing of the exchange rate. In fact, as Table 8 (column 3) shows, only in 1981 did 
the relative price of tradeables (i.e. the, rate of growth of the ratio WPl/CPI) decrease by 8.0 
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percent with respect to 1980.3 Industrial production was also affected only in 1981, the year in 
which the manufacturing industrial production index declined 18 percent. An additional fall of 
13 .1 percent was experienced by this index in 1982. 
Corbo (1985), and Edwards (1985) among others, have argued that another important 
mistake was wage indexation from 1979 onwards. The real wage was 11 out of line 11 from the very 
beginning of the fixed exchange rate regime. This argument has been challenged by Harberger 
(1984) who establishes the fact that the difference between the growth of real wages and GDP was 
only 0.9 percent in 1980. Furthermore, this difference only increased in the second semester of 
1981, so that the indexation of wages became a binding constraint only in the second half of 1981, 
when the rate of growth of GDP began to slowdown. It has been argued that wage indexation only 
became a serious problem when the wage salary index fell 0.2 percent while GDP fell by 14.3 
percent in 1982, thus creating a sharp disequilibrium. 
The sharp reduction in net capital inflows created pressures for devaluation in 1982. Table 
9 shows that the rate of net capital inflows sharply decreased from 14.4 percent of GDP in 1981 
to 5.4 percent of GDP in 1982. Thus, as Harberger claims, an exchange rate that appeared to be 
reasonably viable in the presence of large capital inflows was no longer viable when external 
financial flows virtually dried up. 
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The liberalization of the capital markets faced three main problems: 
1. The high level of real interest rates on loans; 
The relative price of tradeables was proxied by the ratio between the wholesale price index 
(WPI), which is strongly influenced by traded products, and the consumer price index 
(CPI), which contains tradeable and non-tradeable products. 
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2. The low level of domestic savings; and, 
3. Weak government regulations and supervision over lending activity by the financial 
system (i.e., no deposit insurance, no controls for conflict of interest loans, and lax 
loan exposure regulations). 
As can be seen from Table 10 even after the capital account opened and the exchange rate was 
pegged against the dollar in 1979, there was still a substantial differential between domestic and 
foreign (LIBOR) real interest rates. 
This situation, along with the wide spreads between deposit and lending rates, as can be 
seen in Table 11, reflect inefficiency in financial intermediation and market imperfections (i.e. 
lack of competition) in the Chilean banking system. Arellano (1984) argued that the Chilean 
banking system had much higher operational costs than banks of comparable size in the United 
States and other industrialized countries. 
Edwards and Edwards (1987) explain the low level of domestic saving, among other 
factors, by increased foreign indebtedness. This increased the volume of loan activity without 
increasing domestic saving. The lowest level of gross domestic saving was reached in 1981, at 
the same time that the growth of foreign indebtedness achieved its highest level (see Table 12). 
One result of the financial reforms was that both the number of financial institutions and 
the volume of intermediation greatly increased. In fact, in 1981 there were 26 national banks, 15 
financial corporations, and 19 foreign banks, a number sharply higher than the 18 national banks 
and one "financiera" in 1973. However, these increased numbers did not necessarily imply healthy 
competition. The lack of conflict-of-interest regulations and lax loan-exposure rules meant that the 
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increased portfolio concentration of conglomerate groups increased risk exposure (i.e., moral 
hazard) of the Chilean banking system. 
Selected indicators of financial sector behavior are shown in table 13. The proportion of 
total credit going to the private sector increased from 4 7.4 percent in 1973 to 98. 9 percent in 
1981. In addition, the volume of financial intermediation increased. As can be seen in Table 4, 
M2, measured as a proportion of GDP, increased from 10.7 percent in 1973 to 21.2 percent in 
1981. 
Unfortunately, this growth in financial intermediation was not accompanied with effective 
supervision and regulation of the domestic capital market. The weaknesses of supervision and 
control were manifested in 1974 when a number of informal financial corporations started to 
operate. Furthermore, a handful of powerful conglomerates (grupos) began to control the 
country's major banks. These group-owned banks concentrated a large share of their loan 
portfolios in "related firms" which were either owned or controlled by the particular group in 
question. Table 14 shows that in mid-1983 a fifth (21 percent) of the total credit of private banks 
was allocated to firms controlled by bank shareholders; a major increase from the mid-1982 ratio 
(16.4 percent). These groups concentrated their activities in the export sector, the sector that was 
most favored in term of credit allocation during 1978-1981. This sector was also the most affected 
by the world recession of 1982. These groups generated large capital gains by investing in the 
securities of related non-bank enterprises. Such activities allowed them to support relatively poor 
operational returns, and their ownership of major banks allowed them to consolidate control of a 
large volume of assets through debt finance (for details see Galvez and Tybout, 1985). Finally, 
Diaz- Alejandro (1986), Edwards (1985), Corbo (1985), and Arellano (1984) have argued that the 
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rescue of all depositors and creditors in 1977 for one of the national banks (the Banco Osorno) 
provided a de facto deposit insurance precedent for these conglomente banks to ignore risk in their 
future lending activities, generating serious moral hazard problems. 
V CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Government mismanagement and a poorly regulated financial system cannot explain by 
themselves all the variations in Chilean economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Aggregate 
supply disturbances have also played an important role in explaining the recessions of 1974-1975 
and 1982 in Chile. In fact, Chile is a country highly dependent on imported materials. Imported 
intermediate goods make up a large share of total inputs in the country. Chilean intermediate 
good dependence may be observed in Table 15 where more than 50 percent of total imports 
during the period 1973-1981 corresponds to imported materials. Chilean intermediate good 
imports increased from 58.3 percent in 1972 to 66.0 percent and 72.8, in 1973 and 1974, 
respectively, in response to the first oil-shock in 1973. 
After 1976, however, these imports began to decline to reach the lowest level of 
intermediate good imports in 1981 with 50.4 percent of total imports. During those years, in 
which the Chilean economy was at its highest growth level of the decade, consumption good 
imports constituted more than 20 percent of total imports. This reached the highest level in 1981 
(i.e., 29.9 percent of total imports). On the other hand, capital good imports showed relatively 
stable levels, falling below 20 percent of imports only after 1981. It is interesting to note that 
foreign debt increased mainly to support increased consumption good imports. 
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In summary the rapid pace of economic liberalization in Chile from the mid 1970s through 
the early 1980s emphasized growing international indebtedness and growing consumption through 
foreign debt financed imports. Economic policies from 1982 to the present clearly had to redress 
both these structural deficiencies of recent Chilean growth. 
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TABLE 1: CURRENT ACCOUNT AND NET DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT. MAJOR REGIONS 1972-79 
ITEM 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Current Account/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Developed Countries 0.4 0.4 -0.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.5 
(a) 
OIDCs (b) -1. 5 -1. 4 -3.9 -4.9 -3.2 -2.2 -2.4 -2.7 
Net Debt/GDP (c) 
OIDCs 13.7 12.3 12.9 16.3 16.9 18.0 18.5 17.7 
Source: J. Sachs (1981) 
(a) Developed countries refers to all industrial countries. 
(b) Oil importing developing countries. 
( c) Net debt is defined as gross debt minus foreign exchange reserves. 
Current Account Exports FOB + (Imports FOB) + other goods & semi-income net 
+ unequited transfers. 
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TABLE 2· SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY 1970-1985 
YEARS ANNUAL INFLATION OF BALANCE OF RATE OF GROWTH OF M1" FISCAL DEFICIT RATE OF DEVALUATION RATE OF VARIATION UNEMPLOYMENT TERMS OF 
GROWT (DECEMBER-DECEMBER) PAYMENTS SURP- (DECEMBER-DECEMBER} AS PERCENTAGE OF PESO MANUFACTURING GREATER SANTIA- TRADE 
HOF LUS (MILLION US$) OFGPD (DECEMBER-DECEMBER} PRODUCTION INDEX GO (ANNUAL 
GDP (DECEMBER-DECEMBER) (ANNUAL AVERAGE) VARIACTION) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1970 2.1% 34.9% 113.5% - 2.7% - -5.5% 7.1% -11.0% 
1971 9.0 22.1 -299.5 110 10.7 19.5 31.3 5.5 -21.0 
1972 -1.2 163.4 -230.8 157 13.0 71.2 -6.2 3.7 -7.0 
1973 -5.6 508.8 -21.0 317 24.7 1271.0 -5.6 4.7 -38.0 
1974 1.0 375.9 -55.0 272 10.5 372.0 -12.8 9.7 -7.0 
1975 -12.9 340.7 -344.0 258 2.6 409.0 -21.2 16.2 -37.0 
1976 3.5 174.3 414.0 199 2.3 106.0 13.4 16.8 2.0 
1977 9.9 63.5 113.0 108 1.8 62.0 2.3 13.2 -10.0 
1978 8.2 30.3 712.0 67 0.8 22.0 5.3 14.0 -2.0 
1979 8.3 38.9 1047.0 65 -1.7 15.0 6.6 13.6 42.0 
1980 7.8 31.2 1244.0 57 -3.1 0.0 13.3 11.8 -9.0 
1981 5.7 9.5 67.0 -6 -1.7 0.0 -18.4 11.1 -24.0 
1982 -14.3 20.7 -1165.0 9 2.3* 85.0 -13.1 22.1 -18.0 
1983 -0.7 23.1 -541.0 27 3.8* 20.0 4.9 - 10.9 
1984 6.3 23.0 17.0* 12 4.1* 45.0 9.9 -- -3.6 
1985 2.4 26.4 -99.0* 11 - 44.0 - -- -9.1 
SOURCE: Columns 1-7 were obtained from Banco Central de Chile, Monthly Bulletin (various issues). Column 8 obtained from Department of Economics, University of Chile. Column 9 comes from Cortez (1984) and updated after 
1983 with Banco Central de Chile, Bulletin. 
(a) - M1 =Private sector money= Money in Circulation (C} +drawable money of private sector (D1) 
Where C =Money in Circulation (Bank notes, coins and checks issued by Central Bank minus funds of financial system). 
D1 =drawable money of private sector (deposits of non-financial private sector in banking current accounts net of legal reserve). 
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Table 3: DEVALUATION, CHILEAN INFLATION, AND U.S. INFLATION: 1979-1983. 
Year Annual Rate of Annualized U.S. Annualized Annualized 
devaluation of WPI rate of U.S. CPI rate Chilean CPI rate 
the peso inflation of inflation of inflation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1978 22.0 9.6 9.1 37.2 
1979 15.0 14.9 13.3 38.0 
1980 0.0 12.3 12.4 31.2 
1981 0.0 5.6 8.9 9.5 
1982 88.3 1. 5 3.9 20.7 
1983 19.2 1.8 3.8 23.1 
Source: Edwards & Edwards {1987) 
TABLE 4: AVERAGE ANNUAL DEPOSITS IN CHILEAN CURRENCY THE 30th OF EACH 
MONTH, 1970-1983, SELECTED REGIONS. 
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS) 
Years REGION 
Metropolitan v VIII 
1970 56.9 11.0 8.3 
1971 58.5 10.8 8.2 
1972 61.3 9.7 7.3 
1973 62.6 9.1 6.9 
1974 61.2 10.4 7.2 
1975 61.2 10.4 7.2 
1976 62.8 10.0 6.7 
1977 64.8 9.6 6.2 
1978 67.7 9.3 5.6 
1979 69.1 9.5 5.5 
1980 73.2 7.9 4.9 
1981 74.7 7.9 4.5 
1982 72.6 8.6 5.6 
1983 69.7 9.0 5.6 
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Source: Mamalakis (1983) 
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE ANNUAL LOANS IN CHILEAN CURRENCY THE 30th OF EACH MONTH, 
1970-80, SELECTED REGIONS. 
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOANS) 
Years REGION 
Metropolitan v VII 
1970 68.3 6.7 5.0 
1971 67.7 6.4 4.3 
1972 69.6 6.5 4.9 
1973 67.0 8.1 5.3 
1974 61. 7 7.2 5.7 
1975 64.9 4.2 5.7 
1976 63.8 4.8 6.7 
1977 68.8 5.2 5.7 
1978 69.7 4.5 4.4 
1979 75.4 5.8 2.9 
1980 77.6 6.2 2.4 
Source: Mamalakis (1983) 
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TABLE 6: STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM'S PESO LOANS 
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOANS) 
PRIVATE SECTOR (a) PUBLIC SECTOR 
Years (b) Tradable Non - Tradable 
Intermediate Final Others Total Total 
1970 61.6 22.8 10.2 - - 94.7 5.3 
1971 60.0 20.2 10.0 - - 90.2 9.7 
1972 31. 3 15.8 6.9 - - - - 26.7 
1973 32.9 10.3 2.3 2.0 47.4 52.6 
1974 59.1 9.0 2.4 1. 6 - - 17.5 
1975 74.5 10.2 5.6 2.7 9.3 7.4 
1976 69.3 10.7 5.4 2.1 87.5 12.0 
1977 52.5 23.5 6.0 5.5 87.5 11. 8 
1978 50.2 29.9 8.9 5.0 94. 5.0 
1979 44.9 37.8 3.4 12.9 99. 4.4 
1980 30.0 43.4 5.2 17.9 96.5 1.1 
1981 24.3 46.6 5.1 22.9 98.9 0.6 
1982 24.0 44.6 9.5 13.5 91. 6 10.8(c) 
1983 24.9 50.1 15.6 8.6 - - 5.9(c) 
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions 
(a) Tradable Activities: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining 
and Manufacturing. 
Non Tradable Intermediate Activities: Electricity, Gas, Water, 
Construction, Transport and Communications, Wholesale and 
Retail Commerce, Financial Services. 
Non Tradable Services Final Activities: Services, Personal 
Credit to consumers. 
Others: Not-well-specified Activities. 
(b) 1970-78 average annual Loans the 30th of each month. 
1979-83 outstanding loans the 30th of June of each years. 
(c) 1982 and 1983 are loans balances on the 30th of December. 
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TABLE 7: STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM'S PESO LOANS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1970-1983 
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOANS) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1979 1980 1980 1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1983 
(June) (December) (June) (December) (June) (December) (June) (December) (June) (December) 
MINING 0.9 1.7 2.8 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 
MANUFACTURING 36.4 38.6 8.7 13.3 33.1 37.5 32.1 27.2 27.9 25.2 20.8 18.0 14.3 10.9 10.1 10.7 10.7 11.9 12.6 
TRADABLES (TOTAL) 61.6 60.0 31.3 32.9 59.1 74.5 69.3 52.5 50.2 44.9 - 30.0 - 24.3 - 24.0 23.0 24.9 26.9 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 3.5 1.5 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
WATER 
CONSTRUCTION 5.6 5.3 5.2 3.0 1.4 1.8 1.9 3.8 3.6 4.6 5.9 6.2 9.2 11.4 9.4 10.3 10.4 9.4 11.3 
TRADE 15.0 12.2 7.7 4.6 5. 95.9 6.7 16.8 22.4 22.6 21.9 20.3 16.3 17.1 16.6 13.5 14.4 16.1 14.5 
TRANSPORT & COM- 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.5 1.1 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.6 2.6 3.9 3.4 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.4 
MERCE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 4.7 11.2 12.6 15.6 14.6 19.7 16.7 24.2 22.9 16.0 
NONTRADABLE 22.6 20.2 15.6 10.3 9.0 10.2 10.7 23.5 29.9 37.6 - 43.4 - 46.6 - 44.6 50.6 50.1 44.6 
INTERMEDIATE (TOTAL) 
SERVICE 9.3 9.6 6.2 1.1 1.3 4.1 4.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 4.0 5.2 5.4 3.9 1.3 3.7 9.5 9.7 10.6 
PERSONAL CREDIT 0.9 .0.4 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.5 5.0 - - - - 2.2 4.9 5.6 7.6 5.9 4.3 
(CONSUMER) 
NONTRADABLE FINAL 10.2 10.0 6.9 2.3 2.4 5.6 5.4 6.0 6.9 3.4 - 5.2 - 5.1 - 9.5 17.3 15.6 15.1 
(TOTAL) 
OTHERS NONSPECIFIED - - - 2.0 1.6 2.7 2.1 5.5 5.0 12.9 13.9 17.9 16.4 22.9 22.9 13.5 6.9 6.6 13.3 
PRIVATE SECTOR 97.7 90.3 - 47.4 62.5 92.6 66.0 66.2 95.0 95.6 96.0 98.9 99.2 99.4 99.6 - - - -
PUBLIC SECTOR 5.3 9.7 26.7 52.6 17.5 7.4 12.0 11.6 5.0 4.4 2.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 - - - --
TOTAL LOANS 1%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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TABLE 8: STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: DOLLAR LOANS 
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DOLLAR LOANS) 
PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
Years Tradable Non - Tradable 
Intermediate Final 
1969 52.6 3.1 0.8 43.6 
1974 24.0 1.4 3.5 70.6 
1975 63.7 0.5 1. 5 32.2 
1976 46.9 4.3 3.1 43.0 
1977 69.3 5.9 3.3 43.0 
1978 64.4 16.1 13.2 6.3 
1979 69.2 16.1 9.2 5.5 
1980 64.2 24.3 8.1 3.4 
1981 50.3 32.1 14.7 3.0 
1982 37.2 30.7 16.3 15.8 
1983 44.4 38.3 17.0 0.4 
1984 52.1 37.7 10.1 0.2 







TABLE 9: SELECTED INDICATORS IN THE CHILEAN ECONOMY 1978-82 
Rate of Growth of Nominal and Real Exchange Rate, of Ratio WPI/CPI; 
Manufacturing Index; Gap between Growth of GDP and Real Wage; 
Period 1978-1982. 
Rate of growth Rate of growth WPI/CPI Manufacturing Gap rate 
of nominal of real ratio rate index rate of of growth 
exchange rate exchange rate of growth growth GDP-wage 
index 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) ( 5) 
47.0% 5.6% -2.9% 5.3% -5.8% 
17.6 -4.2 10.7 6.6 -2.5 
47.0 -12.0 3.6 13.3 -0.9 
0.0 -7.8 -8.0 -18.4 -3.2 
30.5 26.0 -3.1 -13.1 -14.1 
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Source: This table was processed based on Balassa (1984). 
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TABLE 10: CAPITAL INFLOWS, AND LOANS IN FOREIGN CURRENCY TO TRADEABLE AND 
NON-TRADEABLE SECTORS IN CHILE: 1978 - 1982. 




1980 11. 5 
1981 14.4 
1982 5.4 
Dollar loans to (% of total loans) to 









Source: Column 1 was derived from data in selected Central Bank 
Bulletins 
Column 2 and 3 were taken from Brock (1986) . 
TABLE 11: ANNUAL INTEREST RATE AND DEVALUATION INDICATORS IN CHILE: 
1977 - 1982 
Year Average annual real rate 

















Source: Central Bank Bulletins (various issues) 
Annual Rate of devalua-








TABLE 12: ANNUALIZED SPREAD BETWEEN DEPOSIT AND LENDING INTEREST RATES IN 
CHILE 1979 - 1983 
QUARTER 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1979 20.0% 16.4% 39.3% 14.0% 
33 
1980 9.8 10.9 9.2 7.8 
1981 7.2 9.7 12.1 15.4 
1982 16.2 15.3 26.3 15.0 
1983 17.0 15.2 14.2 12.8 
Source: Edwards & Edwards (1987) 
TABLE 13: INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS IN CHILE: SELECTED YEARS: 1977 - 1982. 
Year Gross fixed capital 
formation/GDP 
Gross domestic saving/GDP Foreign saving/GDP 
(1) (2) 
1970 20.4% 21. 6% 
1976 12.7 15.4 
1977 13.3 10.7 
1978 14.5 11.6 
1979 15.6 13.7 
1980 17.6 15.5 
1981 19.1 8.5 
1982 14.0 n.a 
1983 14.0 n.a 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins (various issues) 











TABLE 14: SELECTED INDICATORS ON THE CHILEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 1973-1981 
Year Share of private sector Credit to private M2/GDP (a) 
credit total credit as sector in real terms 
of in June 30th (1975 = 100) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1973 47.4% 77.2 10.7% 
1974 82.5 88.2 5.4 
1975 92.6 100.0 5.6 
1976 88.0 136.8 5.9 
1977 88.2 270.0 8.3 
1978 95.0 444.3 10.4 
1979 95.6 585.0 12.0 
34 
1980 98.0 817.2 13.2 
1981 98.9 983.7 21.2 
Source: Column 1 and 2 were taken from Central Bank Bulletins 
{various issues) . 
Column 3 is from Edwards & Edwards {1987) . 
{a) M2 Private sector money plus time deposits of private sector 
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TABLE 15: CREDIT CONCENTRATION TO GROUP-RELATED COMPANIES IN CHILE AS A 
PERCENT OF TOTAL BANK PORTFOLIO FROM JUNE 1982 TO JUNE 1983 
INSTITUTION 
Banco de Chile * 
Banco de Santiago * 
Credito e Inversiones 
Sudamericano 
Concepcion * 
Colocadora Nacional * 
International * 
Total Chilean private 
banks 










Dec 1982 June 1983 
18.6 21. 0 
42.3 49.5 




22.8 4. 1 (a) 
19.4 21.4 
(a) The reduction of group-related credit here is explained by the 
legal dismemberment of this group, resulting in the separation of 
the bank from the other firms in the group. 
TABLE 16: CHILE: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS. 
(As a Percent of Total Imports) 
Year Intermediate Goods Capital Goods Consumption Goods 
(1) (2) (3) 
1971 61. 8 17.1 21. 0 
1972 58.3 22.1 19.6 
1973 66.0 19.8 14.1 
1974 72.8 20.8 6.3 
1975 65.2 28.3 6.5 
1976 66.9 21.1 12.9 
1977 57.3 20.9 23.3 
1978 58.4 21.8 19.8 
1979 59.0 20.8 20.2 
1980 53.4 20.9 25.7 
1981 50.4 19.6 29.9 
1982 56.6 16.5 26.9 
1983 69.2 12.1 18.8 
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Source: Central Bank Bulletins (various issues) 
